Thoughts & Comments
What's This Cycle's Barnett or Valley National? Synovus Financial
The last shall be first, and probably in a very big way

Thomas Brown  ( about me )
Posted 11/20/2009
bankstocks.com
tbrown@bankstocks.com

If you want to know which beaten-up bank stocks will provide the most ample returns from here, go back and look at what happened last cycle. Back in 1990, after bank stocks bottomed in November, the charge was led by those banks that still had significant credit quality problems and were still reporting quarterly losses. Then, as the cycle rolled on, the companies steadily managed through their credit issues and eventually returned to normalized profitability—and their stock prices zoomed.

Two of my biggest winners back then were Barnett Banks, at that time the largest bank headquartered in Florida, and Valley National, the largest in Arizona. Both were located in growth areas, and both had above-average exposure to commercial real estate loans. At first, investors (me included) underestimated the magnitude of the companies’ credit problems. It wasn’t pretty. The stocks got clobbered as the market extrapolated problems in selected loan portfolios to the loan portfolios overall, and then significantly overestimated the ultimate size of the companies’ credit losses.  

But the bears on Barnett and Valley were soon amazed when credit costs finally did peak, and they were astounded by how quickly the banks returned to normalized profitability.  The companies’ stock prices exploded. Valley National went from $9 in November, 1990 to $50 by April, 1992.  That’s a five-plus bagger in less than two years.

I believe many bank stocks are on the verge of similar moves now. Some have already started theirs: Fifth Third, for example, traded around $1 in back in February. It trades for around $10 today as investors have slowly realized (correctly, in my opinion) that credit costs have peaked and the company and its stock are headed back toward normalized earnings and valuation levels. 

However, not all the banks we expect to survive have generated the same level of investor confidence. Which brings us to Synovus Financial, a company we own in the investment partnership I run. Its stock doesn’t look so different from how Fifth Third looked back in February: earlier this week, the stock hit a 17-year low!

On Wednesday we traveled to Columbus, Georgia to spend the better part of a day with management, discussing the company’s outlook. Our conclusion: Synovus could be one of this cycle’s equivalents to Barnett and Valley National.  It could indeed be a five-bagger over the next couple of years! 

As you might imagine, both the bull case and the bear case on Synovus are straightforward, and center mainly on credit. To us bulls, credit costs have peaked, and the company will return to profitability by the second half of 2010. Meanwhile, Synovus has sufficient capital to absorb the additional operating losses between now and then. After that, normalized profitability will return by 2012. This outlook is not reflected in the stock’s current valuation which, with the stock at $1.62, works out to 40% of tangible book value.

I wish I could make it more complicated. Sorry.  

The bears on Synovus, meanwhile, believe credit costs have not peaked, and that future operating losses will blow away so much of the company’s capital base that it will be forced to massively dilute existing shareholders with another capital raise--if it can complete one at all.

But, as I say, I believe the bears are too bearish. Let me walk you through why I believe Synovus’s credit costs have already peaked and why a dilutive equity raise will not occur.  First, credit: 

1.       The worst-performing loan portfolios have begun to shrink. In any major credit cycle, different loan categories will have vastly different default frequencies and loss severity. For Synovus, the worst portfolios, both in frequency and severity, have been (by product type) loans to homebuilders and (by geography) loans in the Atlanta metro area and in Florida.

Not surprisingly, the nexus of Synovus’ problems is loans to homebuilders in the Atlanta metro area. The chart below shows that the pool of performing loans to homebuilders has shrunk by 46% overall at Synovus, while the subset of loans to homebuilders in Atlanta is down by 66%!



New nonaccrual loans from this pool of performing loans will almost certainly shrink going forward, since the overall pool has declined so sharply, and because the remaining, performing loans almost, by definition, are loans to stronger developers or better projects.  In addition, in both Atlanta and Florida home values and sales activity have started to improve

2.       The inflow of new nonaccrual loans will continue to slow. The chart below shows the dollar amount of loans that went on nonaccrual, by quarter, over the first three quarters of this year, as well as our forecast for the fourth quarter. 



Investors and management were disappointed by the very small decline in new nonaccrual loans in the third quarter. The two tables below break out the new nonaccrual loans, by product type and geography. 






Management said on its third quarter earnings conference call, and repeated to us this week, that it expects to see reduced nonaccrual inflow this quarter from Florida and Georgia.  We suspect that the decline in nonaccruals, by property type, will be greatest among residential property loans because of the decline that’s already taken place in the performing portfolios, as well as the general stabilization of the housing markets.

3.       The level of net chargeoffs should start to decline. The other negative surprise in the company’s third quarter earnings was the jump in net chargeoffs Synovus reported. Take a look:



But there are several reasons to expect chargeoffs to begin to decline, starting in the fourth quarter. First, there’s the lower level of new nonaccrual loans we expect. They are typically written down by 15% to 20% once they shift from performing to nonaccrual.

Second, third-quarter chargeoffs included $135 million (27% of total chargeoffs) to write down the carrying values of existing nonperforming loans. As shown in the table below, nonaccrual loans have now been written down by 28%, and have additional specific reserves of 14% of the original loan balance, which brings the cumulative writedown and reserve to 42% of the original nonaccrual loan balances. 



This is a valuation level that’s in-line with the company’s recent disposition activity, so we would expect a meaningful reduction in net chargeoffs from existing nonperforming loans.

4.       The level of OREO writedowns should also start to decline. Synovus had $606 million of credit expenses in the third quarter, including an unusually high $101 million in OREO expenses.



OREO writedowns should decline for three reasons. First, new nonaccrual loans moving into OREO have been written down to lower values than in prior periods. Second, the company will be less aggressive in OREO disposition. Finally, loss content of future OREO dispositions will be lower than in the past because properties being disposed of now tend to include more income-producing properties and less land than they did before.

5.       Loan loss reserve building has slowed and will soon stop; reserves will begin to be drawn down next year. As we’ve written about before, the amount of loss-reserve building or reduction is primarily based on changes in loan grades of the entire loan portfolio, both performing and nonperforming.

As you can see in the next chart, the quarterly loan loss reserve build at Synovus has begun to decline as the loan grades in its portfolio have begun to stabilize.




Not only do we expect this to continue but, next year, as more loans are upgraded, we believe the company will begin to bring its loan loss reserve (3.5% of total loans) down by provisioning less than its quarterly level of net chargeoffs.

These are the critical elements to the Synovus credit story, which is key to the company’s earnings outlook.  In the third quarter, total credit expenses of $606 million drove the company into an operating loss.  For the reasons I mention above, those expenses should be meaningfully lower in the fourth quarter and should continue to decline thereafter until they reach around $40 million on a quarterly basis as the company’s profitability returns to normal.

Capital 

The company’s key capital ratios are strong, as you can see:

 

We expect these capital ratios to decline some in the coming quarters, but the declines will be partially offset by other actions, such as balance sheet shrinkage (as excess liquidity comes down) and gains on asset sales. 

Assuming the company turns profitable in the third quarter of next year, its initial earnings will be tax-free.  Then after a few quarters of profitability, the company will be able to reverse its deferred-tax asset reserve, which today totals $331 million.  This would boost the company’s capital ratios by around115 basis points and boost tangible book value by 70 cents per share, or 15%.

Given our forecast for improving credit, declining credit costs, and modestly improving pre-tax, pre-credit cost earnings, we expect manageable operating losses and a modest decline in the company’s capital ratios before they start to sharply improve in the second half of 2010 and in 2011.  Under this scenario, we do not expect a dilutive capital raise!

Normalized Earnings and Valuation 

Here is the company’s quarterly (annualized) pre-tax, pre-credit income over the last six quarters, along with our estimate of normalized earnings:

 

Given this level of income, $160 million of “normalized” credit expenses, a full tax rate, no TARP preferred dividends, and 490 million shares outstanding, we see normalized EPS of 70 cents per share.  Assuming a below-historical normal P/E multiple of 12 times, we see the stock trading between $8 and $9 over the next two to three years, making it a potential five-bagger from today’s stock price. 

Those of you that remember the last major bank cycle, dust off your memories of companies like Barnett, Valley National, Shawmut, Bank of Boston, and  even Wells Fargo.  Synovus looks to me like this cycle’s equivalent version.

What do you think? Let me know!


  Add your comment

 

 

StoneFoxCapital Posted On 11/20/2009 3:32:34 PM

Wish management would just let you do the talking for them. The market gets flashbacks to Lehman Brothers every time a bank CEO says the capital ratios are fine. Thanks for the report.

PaulinKansasCity Posted On 11/20/2009 4:15:49 PM

Tom; I always appreciate your willingness to share ideas; opening yourself to criticism is no fun and you have no reason to do so in my opinion. I think a real risk impossible to handicap easily is the FDIC arbitrarily suggests more capital be raised and hence dilution; you are an informed investor and can better estimate this risk more than most but the Market as a whole believes this is a distinct possibility (my opinion obviously). The other factor is deleveraging of the economy (Pimco's New Normal) that will make reduce normalized earnings; now whether or not the Market "believes" this I have no idea; I have a feeling everyone is so shellshocked it is wait and see; I certainly see that in many businesses. Thanks for this article!

Nick W Posted On 11/20/2009 4:26:21 PM

Georgia's had more than it's share of (well deserved, in my opinion) bank failures--where shaky institutions with high percentages of brokered deposits lent gobs of capitial to board-crony real estate developers. I'm afraid Synovus's stock has been unfairly painted with the same brush. In contrast, as you've pointed out for years, Richard Anthony and team are smart bankers who've built a smart franchise. The fundamentals are there. Thanks

Atlantabanking 101 Posted On 11/20/2009 4:54:21 PM

Stock will see 2.80 next week

sammy Posted On 11/20/2009 9:00:32 PM

tom good job, however i wish you would have reinforced the analysis with a job market analysis........if jobs begin to recover u have a winner,,,,,,,,, please address this thanks

jrallen81 Posted On 11/21/2009 1:02:57 AM

Tom, as a Synovus employee I have quite the personal interest in this :) Thank you for the analysis, its very well reasoned -- to be expected from a top financials analyst/HF manager! Anyway it seems that in the space its unavoidable that you have to rely on management's commentary. In combination with at-times opaque accounting and heavy macro sensitivity, that can make for a higher level of risk. Do you agree you have to rely to a significant degree on management for analysis of the banking space?

MEB inToronto Posted On 11/21/2009 7:25:02 AM

Tom congratulations on once again sharing you valuable insights on bank stocks. This is what made this my go-to site for the past 5 years. Lately however you had been very quiet on the analytics front, producing rather a steady flow of editorial material which while I enjoy, isn't as compelling as seeing somebody really come up with objective hard won analytics. The only part of your thesis Im not clear on is the statement: "We suspect that the decline in nonaccruals, by property type, will be greatest among residential property loans because of the decline that’s already taken place in the performing portfolios, as well as the general stabilization of the housing markets." Are they not exposed to the ALT-A pig in the python that comes due in 2010 and 2011?

Allen Klee Posted On 11/21/2009 9:08:13 PM

Hi, this is a very interesting idea. What losses are you modelling for next yr and what does that imply for how low the capital ratio goes?

Gino Verza Posted On 11/22/2009 3:52:38 PM

Tom, Great analysis. Thank you for sharing and for the free access to your homepage. The 9/30/09 10Q shows that "Pre-tax, pre credit costs income was at 141.7 million, down $3.1 million from the second quarter of 2009." Please explain the following: a) the difference between the 10Q information quoted above and the annualized figures in the last chart in your article. b) Why the chart shows an improvement between Q2 and Q3 vs. a decrease in the 10Q. Thank you. Gino Verza

Pit Posted On 11/22/2009 9:29:32 PM

I also remember Bank of New England Corporation (including the massive insider buying shortly before it failed) Please contrast SNV to Bank of New England.

wkhrdnsmrt Posted On 11/23/2009 3:47:10 PM

Recent Posts on Google re: snv Talk about two diametrically opposed views... On friday istockanalyst called SNV a fivebagger as a result of meetings with the SNV management team... Today Collins Stewart calls it a dog that needs $700M in additional capital and could be a receivership candidate for FDIC... target $1.25!!! This is frankly exasperating being caught in the middle... How can it be that there are such a huge gap in sentiment given the facts? Is management lying? Is one party a short trying to manipulate the stock downward artificially? Thoughts? __________ one commentary comes from india and from a brokerage company that has bad publicity and allegations of mkt manipulation and biased recommendations in the past. a pretender or wannabe of sorts? the other comes from an analysis of someone who has been in the banking industry through a few economic cycles, states his positions if there is a conflict, has an open 'peer review' web site, provides a sound and fundamental analysis....(that many firms and analysts attempt to charge for, yet provide no basis for their 2 cents comments, and attempt to manipulate share price). this one individual is very well regarded in the financial industry...and credible, putting their money where their mouth is/ along with the board and officers of the company. Res Ipse Loquiter!

bankman Posted On 11/23/2009 7:53:12 PM

pit, excellent point. tom, you forget about all the banks that failed during the late 80s and early 90s? you seem to only want to compare SNV to the banks that survived! This cycle is arguably much worse, expecially for a bank that has 35% of its assets tied up in non-owner -occupied commercial real estate in georgia and florida. One more point, FITB stock went o $1 becasue the market was pricing in a potential depression and massive systemic banking collapse. When that did not materialize, the stock simply went back to an appropriate level. FITB is still on shaky ground, as are many of its peers.

BankAnalyst Posted On 11/23/2009 9:22:06 PM

Tom - what do you think about SNV's capital ratio assumptions? In their capital raising road show deck, they say their pro forma ratios at the end of 2010 are assuming: 1) releasing $500 million (>50%) of their reserves by the end of 2010, b) earning $20 million more per quarter than they have been for each of the last three quarters (meaning organic capital creation could be $100 million overstated), c) the recapture of the now-increasing DTA, and d) total credit expense not exceeding another $1 billion over the next five quarters ($200 million per quarter, which includes foreclosed real estate disposition costs, mind you). The first point alone stretches credulity. It is one thing to think losses are peaking. and it is yet another thing to think SNV may start to release reserves, but does anyone think they will be allowed to burn through 50% of their reserves by the end of 2010? Either the market or their regulators will punish them, I think.

BankAnalyst Posted On 11/23/2009 10:50:45 PM

Tom - what do you think about SNV's capital ratio assumptions? In their capital raising road show deck, they say their pro forma ratios at the end of 2010 are assuming: 1) releasing $500 million (>50%) of their reserves by the end of 2010, b) earning $20 million more per quarter than they have been for each of the last three quarters (meaning organic capital creation could be $100 million overstated), c) the recapture of the now-increasing DTA, and d) total credit expense not exceeding another $1 billion over the next five quarters ($200 million per quarter, which includes foreclosed real estate disposition costs, mind you). The first point alone stretches credulity. It is one thing to think losses are peaking. and it is yet another thing to think SNV may start to release reserves, but does anyone think they will be allowed to burn through 50% of their reserves by the end of 2010? Either the market or their regulators will punish them, I think.

nishitmehta Posted On 11/24/2009 2:10:10 PM

tom, i hope this analysis of yours for SNV; works out cause the past few ones;eg. MBIA, ambac, Primus,have exposed your assumptions about the severity of this cycle; and am wondering if you are being overly optimistic right now about the provisioning.

jesselivermore Posted On 11/24/2009 2:57:12 PM

Dilution could be worse than you allow for: Expect a premium exchange offer to convert the sub debt to equity - which at current shares prices could create 300ml additional shares. This may be necessary to roll the TARP Pr up to the Trust Preferred level as a precursor for raising much more equity to see them through the cycle. Could be a survivor, but with a much bigger denominator, and little upside for the common.

harvey pitt Posted On 11/24/2009 7:31:26 PM

you're strategy has blown up in your face. you post these articles so you can pump and dump, but the intelligent analysis and criticism from readers such as bankman and bankanalyst highlight your errors, and actually hurt the very stocks you're trying to pump and dump. you should probably just stop writing publicly.

Joe Posted On 11/25/2009 10:38:16 AM

Are you concerned about the $220 million owed to Synovus by the Sea Island Company which has just turned over title to the 3,000 acre Frederica development and the 400 acre Cannons Point development to Wells Fargo(Bloomberg).

tex805 Posted On 1/3/2010 11:20:53 PM

For more on the Sea Island debacle, the insider lending, and the double sets of books, read http://finance.yahoo.com/news/How-Sea-Island-Became-a-bizwk-3623158781.html?x=0&.v=1

jollygood Posted On 2/18/2010 11:12:02 AM

whats total CRE exposure?

DK Posted On 5/4/2010 10:10:10 AM

Given our forecast for improving credit, declining credit costs, and modestly improving pre-tax, pre-credit cost earnings, we expect manageable operating losses and a modest decline in the company’s capital ratios before they start to sharply improve in the second half of 2010 and in 2011. Under this scenario, we do not expect a dilutive capital raise! Ouch! That last sentence has got to sting over last week's secondary at $2.75/share. Do you plan on updating your value of the company?
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