Fiserv
Thoughts & Comments
Warren Buffett: Tangible Common Equity Ratio Is Way Overhyped
Of course it is. Now, to un-brainwash the brainwashed.

Thomas Brown  ( about me )
Posted 04/23/2009
bankstocks.com
tbrown@bankstocks.com

I’ve been so busy listening to earnings calls this week that I haven’t had a chance to blow a gasket about this:

WASHINGTONPresident Obama’s top economic advisers have determined that they can shore up the nation’s banking system without having to ask Congress for more money any time soon, according to administration officials. 

In a significant shift, White House and Treasury Department officials now say they can stretch what is left of the $700 billion financial bailout fund further than they had expected a few months ago, simply by converting the government’s existing loans to the nation’s 19 biggest banks into common stock.

Converting those loans to common shares would turn the federal aid into available capital for a bank — and give the government a large ownership stake in return. [Emph. added] 

So the government is considering taking huge direct stakes in the country’s big banks. What an awful idea. First, the feds’ existing TARP investment is in preferred stock, not debt, so conversion into common will have no effect on banks’ equity accounts. (The tangible equity fetishists will dispute this; I’ll get to them in a minute.)  But more to the point, the prospect of the federal government deciding to become a major common shareholder of some of the country’s big banks is a potential disaster for the industry and the economy. Here’s why:

1. As we’ve already seen, the government can’t resist the urge to micromanage banks’ business, and rarely productively. Even as a preferred holder, it has stuck its nose into matters ranging from whether banks should hold offsite business conferences to how they should spend their marketing dollars. Sometimes the meddling is harmless. But in the case of AIG, it has materially hurt the competitive position of a number of the company’s businesses, and figures to cost taxpayers billions. Can you imagine what would happen if the government became a major common shareholder? Let’s just say maximizing value would not be its first priority.  

2. The preferred-stock conversion that the government has in mind wouldn’t add a single dollar’s worth of new capital to banks’ balance sheets. All it would do instead is re-label one form of equity (preferred) as another (common). This doesn’t even count as rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. It’s more like leaving them where they are and repainting them.

3. The bigger the government’s stake in big banks, the harder it will be for banks to attract private capital. Private investors have already seen what it’s like investing in banks alongside Uncle Sam. And once the government does become shareholder, when, exactly would it divest itself? Six months? Ten years? It would be up to the federal government to decide. But the government isn’t always rational, and can’t be counted on to act in the interests of its fellow shareholders.  

4. And don’t even get me started on the politicization of credit allocation, which would be inevitable, and could occur on a very large scale.

Meanwhile, the first, last, and only point of this TARP conversion scheme (which, I repeat, would be a disaster), would be to raise banks’ tangible equity to tangible assets ratios. Again, no cash would change hands. The mighty, misguided Cult of TCE, however, would be appeased.  

It’s ridiculous. For some reason, bank investors have lately come to view a single, once-obscure number, tangible-common equity to tangible assets, as indispensable in judging a bank’s balance sheet. Why, exactly, I’m not sure. For years, bank regulators have made clear that they only care about three ratios: Tier 1, Total Capital, and Leverage. I suspect that the only reason anyone cares about TCE now is that (as befits the zeitgeist of the banking industry these days) it makes so many institutions look so bad.

But who cares? The TCE ratio has all kinds of problems that make it not a great indicator of a bank’s true financial health. No one can agree what the precise definition of capital is, for starters. And the ratio can exclude some intangibles, such as MSRs, that clearly have value. And it includes unrealized gains and losses, which puts the number at the whim of the markets. And, as noted, regulators shouldn’t care. 

The problems with the TCE ratio are endless; people should stop obsessing over it. But if you don’t believe me, ask Warren Buffett. He weighs in on the matter in the upcoming edition of Fortune. When it comes to TCE, the Oracle could care less:

You don't make money on tangible common equity. You make money on the funds that people give you and the difference between the cost of those funds and what you lend them out on. And that's where people get all mixed up incidentally on things like the TARP. They say, 'Well, where'd the 5 billion go or where'd the 10 billion go that was put in?' That isn't what you make money on. You make money on that deposit base of $800 billion that they've got now. 

Coca-Cola, Buffett notes, has no tangible equity at all, and nobody seems upset. Yet for some reason the number has become the most important statistic in banking. As regards Wells Fargo’s notoriously low TCE ratio, in particular, Buffett isn’t bothered:

To the extent that [Wells’s]  tangible common equity is low, a) nobody was even talking about that a year ago. And b) they should be talking about earning power.  

Precisely. And earnings power, in turn, is determined by the cost and stickiness of your deposits and the quality of your assets. What you name the various slices of your capital base is pretty much beside the point.

Or would be beside the point, except that the market’s new emphasis on tangible capital now threatens to lead to a government semi-takeover of some of the country’s biggest banks.  

By now, I’ve given up trying to change anyone’s mind on the TCE issue and am instead just waiting for the hysteria to pass. Until it does, TCE-ites will no doubt read the Buffett interview and accuse him of “talking his book.” That’s nonsense. He understands the basics of how banks make money, while they’re hung up on arcane balance sheet items. In the meantime, the sooner the TCE cult fades away, the better.

What do you think? Let me know!


  Add your comment

 

 

Chilly Posted On 4/23/2009 11:39:52 AM

The progression of focus to ever more equity-ish capital, and then to ever more tangible-ish equity has paralleled pretty well the increasing distress of the sector. The only context in which it seems to "make sense" to focus on TCE is a liquidation scenario, in which case earnings power doesn't matter because there won't be any, anymore. It's unsettling to see the regulators/politicians focusing on that metric because it suggests that they think the liquidation scenario is relevant. Luckily, they probably just haven't thought it through enough one way or the other.

Joe V Posted On 4/23/2009 12:16:31 PM

Cry baby. The gov't is trashed for not saving Lehman Bro. and trashed for saving financials with TARP and other save the Zombies schemes. Funny how bankers are geniuses when the economy is up but they blame the economy for their current woes. It shows any idiot can run or ruin a bank. How many bankers have lost their jobs? Buffett should worry more about Berkshire and less about gov't policies. What you guys ignore that the banks are protected from disclosing their real problems by keeping CAMELS secret. Shhh!

wcole Posted On 4/23/2009 12:54:23 PM

Agree. The banks are in an interesting enviroment. Tail wind of credit spreads and head wind of credit defaults. For long term investors the question is which wind will blow the longest and strongest. I think that the odds are with the credit spread being the strongest a sustainable wind. The banks with large investment banking arms (b of a...etc) will also have to deal with the head wind of the creative products like cds's they sold. I really dont understand the real risks here so I will stay away.

Erich Riesenberg Posted On 4/23/2009 1:10:43 PM

Thinking people stopped listening to Buffett in September when he supported a TARP which would pay market prices while Treasury was planning a TARP which paid above market. If only CNBC employed people smart enough to question whether Buffett was confused or a shill.

bankman1 Posted On 4/23/2009 2:14:14 PM

Tom, Preferred equity is the same as debt. I dont know why you insist it is equity. Further, your logic does not make sense. you say pfd and common are one in the same, so why do you care if they convert it? from your perspective it makes no difference, so why you getting all worked up about it? govt will have same influence whether it is common or pfd anyway. I would also point WB to a recent note by the merrill stratgeist that recently retired, he says that balance sheets are more important than earnings - banks are balance sheets (as opposed to coke) - apples and oranges.

Benjamin Graham Posted On 4/23/2009 2:28:27 PM

Tangible common equity and leverage ( or the lack thereof ) is the investor's "MARGIN OF SAFETY." It is all well and good to talk about "earnings power" but that theoretical number isn't going to do anybody a damn bit of good if a bank doesn't have the staying power to ensure its emergence from the Valley of Death. In the current environment— and all else equal— given a choice between a relatively unleveraged bank at a lower price to tangible book and a more leveraged bank at a higher price to tangible book, it's a simple and easy choice.

Un-Brainwashed Posted On 4/23/2009 2:46:58 PM

Preferred Stock is the same as Debt? What school did you not graduate from. ?? You don't make a debt payment and the debt holders can shut you down and wipe you out in their favor. Sometimes they can do the same even if you make your payments, but some financial ratios fall below a certain level (loan convenants). You don't make a preferred stock dividend....it's just too bad for those stockholders. Even if the dividends are cumulative (many are not), there is no guarantee you will ever get a penny. In a bankruptcy the preferred stockholders are only in front of the common stockholders. Even the outside florist who waters the plants in the office will get paid before the preferred stockholders. The debt holders are in front of the line and have control. Hardly the same..

John Anderson Posted On 4/23/2009 3:13:26 PM

Tom, You (and the Oracle) are so,so correct! The whole concept of TCE is a pathetic talking point for some very insecure analysts. John

Madbanker Posted On 4/23/2009 3:28:51 PM

Why is the government taking a huge direct stake in "big" banks such a bad idea. If the Privatization of social security proposal had passed would the government not have a big equity stake in every publicly traded company in the U.S. ?

On Another Note Posted On 4/23/2009 4:17:13 PM

Agree, get the US Government the hell out! As a former bank regulator, I can tell that they have looked at TCE for years (pre-1980) as common measure of viability and safety. TCE is not a regulator's passing fancy. Earnings margins are great if credit quailty is sound. But poor lending that yields substantial credit losses can quickly eviscerate any bank with great spreads. (If you want to see another instance of negative tangible equity: IBM Also, note the $10B of common repurchases IBM management orchestrated in order to maximize their (EPS) incentive payouts. )

ronald redfield Posted On 4/23/2009 4:51:47 PM

" All it would do instead is re-label one form of equity (preferred) as another (common). This doesn’t even count as rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. It’s more like leaving them where they are and repainting them." When we analyse banks we typically consider preferred to be debt. Hence for us, any conversion would be a potential positive.

cap'bob Posted On 4/23/2009 6:03:10 PM

How to you make analysts see the light? I agree with you..but am frustrated by the lack of common sens.

bankman1 Posted On 4/23/2009 8:39:05 PM

unbrainwashed - you make my point for me. If it is not debt, but rather it is equity - then who cares if its converted to common or not? its one in the same, tomayto, tomahto. banks balance sheets are way different than regular companies. the debt is in the form of deposits, the majority of the rest of the right side of the balance sheet is equity. different ball game when you are talking about solvency and who is in line for a claim in a bankruptcy situation, etc. This is questioning whether or not the bank is effectively insolvent (under-water on your mortgage, so-to-speak) and if you took out a home equity loan to beef up your LTV, well, that just makes no sense. I hope you follow me here....I know you are very concerned about what school I went to - but try to stay with me here.

pmulqueeney Posted On 4/24/2009 11:42:54 AM

Tom, I agree with you and Mr. Buffett! I think that the Politico's see this as a way to advance their agenda of wealth transfer along with control of the credit system of our country. This is scary! PMM

Ron Redfield Posted On 4/24/2009 11:54:10 AM

I have found bankstocks.com to be terribly error proned. I email them, no response (just like some of the girls I would call for dates 30 years ago.) In addition to that, the track record of TB seems to be unmatched.

Parkite Posted On 4/24/2009 12:21:34 PM

@ Ron - Agreed. This site is just a platform for TB to talk his book. Hey TB - Any thoughts on FMD? Or CCRT?

Sam C Posted On 4/27/2009 11:28:54 AM

One modest exception to your comment. The layers of capital matter to bond investors. A lot. Although that has no bearing on the specific question of common vs. TARP preferred, but then you are next-door neighbors with hybrids, which do matter.

Jerry in Detroit Posted On 4/27/2009 1:20:36 PM

If the last days of the ill-famed "Mustang Ranch" is any indication, we can only expect to be well amused by this manure storm of ineptitude.

tompain Posted On 4/27/2009 2:27:31 PM

I think the reason everyone became obsessed with TCE was that equity investors began to focus on it as a source of valuation support when stock prices were plummeting. The plummeting of course was driven in large part by fear of dilutive government action. If you are thinking about buying stock in an institution that the government might require to raise capital, one way to think about the price you should pay is to come up with a price you think is so low that even in dire circumstances an institution ought to be able to raise capital at that price. 1x tangible book comes to mind. So the stocks headed for 1x TBV. Meanwhile, the government, in its wisdom, appears to have been using falling stock prices as an indication of where it needs to intervene. The government therefore concludes that if it can push up tbv, it can push up stock prices, and everything will be fine. It's stupid, but it explains the obsession with tbv.

DLB Posted On 4/27/2009 4:02:05 PM

Looks like the Fed seems to care about tangible common equity. Reading through the last page of the white paper I back into a 5% plus TCE (to risk weighted assets) ratio for most of the 19 banks as a goal. (After adjusting for AOCI and minority interests)

apj Posted On 4/29/2009 12:02:09 AM

So you think "good will" is acceptable as capital? Please. Give me TCE any day. And comparing non-financial corporates balance sheets to bank balance sheets is just mixing apples and oranges. They are completely different animals. The world doesn't skip a beat without Coke, but it has an awfully tough time without a banking and credit sector.

apj Posted On 4/29/2009 3:07:02 AM

So you think "good will" is acceptable as capital? Please. Give me TCE any day. And comparing non-financial corporates balance sheets to bank balance sheets is just mixing apples and oranges. They are completely different animals. The world doesn't skip a beat without Coke, but it has an awfully tough time without a banking and credit sector.

jake Posted On 4/29/2009 11:15:35 AM

The reason we do need to look at TCE for the banks is that it defines a measure of the risk inherent in the bank. The leverage of debt to equity, or deposits to equity, or assets to equity....all suggest a level of risk and "staying power" of the bank. It is different with say Coke since the equjity required to support that business is very different than that of a bank. Wipe out , write-off 5-10% of a bank's loans and you effectively have an insolvent bank. And this is where we are. So TCE matters. Changing the accounting rules is not the answer. Better risk management, good governance , healthy reserves and modest, proper compensation plans for management is a big part of the answer.

Analyst Posted On 4/30/2009 11:54:33 AM

Your coca cola example leads me to think you don't have any idea about the need for a tangible capital base when using the balance sheet to take large market and credit risks. Comparing Coca Cola to a bank/former broker is misguided.

Analyst Posted On 4/30/2009 11:57:20 AM

Tom, Please comments from jake and api. I agree with them.

grammar boy Posted On 5/11/2009 12:33:25 PM

it's "the Oracle could not care less" not could care less. Otherwise, damn good article
Ad for inter-arch
Ad for Bankstocks
 

     Bankstocks.com is a public web site operated by individuals who also operate investment advisory firms that serve as investment advisers to hedge funds (the "Firms"). Some articles are authored by employees of the Firms while others are authored by third parties. Under no circumstances does any article posted on Bankstocks.com represent a recommendation to buy or sell a security. This article is intended to provide insight into the financial services industry and is not a solicitation of any kind. The Firms do not vouch for the accuracy of any information contained in any article posted herein and the views expressed in any article herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Firms. The Firms buy and sell securities on behalf of their fund investors and may do so, before and after any particular article herein is published, with respect to the securities discussed in any article posted herein. The Firms’ appraisal of a company's prospects is only one factor that affects the Firms’ decision whether to buy or sell shares in that company. Other factors might include, but are not limited to, the presence of mandatory limits on individual positions, decisions regarding portfolio exposures, and general market conditions, and liquidity needs. As such, there may not always be consistency between the views expressed in this article and the Firms’ trading on behalf of their fund investors. There may be conflicts between the content posted on Bankstocks.com and the interests of the Firms. For an explanation of these conflicts, including an explanation of our trading policy, and how we resolve them, click here.

Neither the authors nor any Bankstocks.com team members can provide investment advice or respond to individual requests for recommendations. However, we encourage your feedback and welcome your comments on any of the articles on this site. Neither the authors nor Bankstocks.com has undertaken any responsibility to update any portion of this article in response to events which may transpire subsequent to its original publication date.