Fiserv
Thoughts & Comments
Dr. Doom's Sketchy Calculation
In tallying his loss estimate for Wells Fargo, he forgot to include a key number

Thomas Brown  ( about me )
Posted 02/25/2009
bankstocks.com
tbrown@bankstocks.com

Time magazine, now in the bank stress-testing business itself, reports that according to Nouriel Roubini’s estimate of a cumulative loan loss of 13%, Wells Fargo is sitting on additional losses (cover the children’s eyes) of $117 billion in its loan book. Inasmuch as the company has only reserved for $58 billion of that, the $117 billion figures to eat up 60% of the company’s capital. Which means, says Time, that Wells is not one of the most strongly capitalized big banks, as is commonly supposed, but one of the weakest. Or, as the magazine puts it: “Defibrillator. Stat!”  

Dr. Doom strikes again! There’s just one problem with his Wells loss estimate, though: he’s bollixed up its calculation. In particular, Roubini apparently neglected (and I’m at a loss to see how he managed to do this) to take into account the $37 billion in marks Wells already took against Wachovia’s loan book when it acquired the company at the start of the year.

How do I know Roubini messed up? First, compare his loss estimates for other big banks with other stress-case loss estimates lately being published, notably by Sanford C. Bernstein. (The Bernstein base stress estimates, by the way, are nobody’s idea of bullish fairy tales; the firm sees huge losses coming for all the big banks.)  Yes, Roubini’s estimates are higher for sure—but by only 10% to 20%. He sees cumulative losses of $106 billion at Citigroup, for instance, while Bernstein’s stress-case loss estimate (twice its base-case estimate) is $98 billion. JPMorgan Chase? Roubini, $97 billion; Bernstein, $80 billion. 

But when it comes to Wells, the two sets of estimates aren’t just different by 10% or 20%; they’re miles apart. Against Roubini’s $117 billion estimate, Bernstein’s stress-case number is just  . . . $66 billion.

But if you subtract the $37 billion in Wachovia marks Roubini apparently forgot, you’re down to $80 billion, or 20% more than the Bernstein estimate and roughly in line with the gaps between the estimates for the other two banks.  

Roubini’s $117 billion loss estimate for Wells is bogus. It’s not that the Doctor has come up with assumptions we don’t agree with. Rather, he messed up his basic arithmetic.

You think I’m quibbling. But this is a guy who has no problem telling the Wall Street Journal that Wells is a “zombie bank,” or helping Time magazine declare that the company is on the verge of being put on life support. Is it too much to ask him to have his numbers straight?  

Before Roubini keeps pronouncing Wells a dead bank walking, he ought to address in some more detail how he gets to his $117 billion cumulative loss estimate for the company. And if it turns out that he’s goofed in calculating it, he ought to come out and admit it.

What do you think? Let me know!


  Add your comment

 

 

BobE Posted On 2/25/2009 1:42:31 PM

Maybe I'm bad at math, too, but Wells' loan loss reserve is $21 billion and the marks on Wachovia's portfolio are another $37 billion. Add 'em up and you get $58 billion. If you want to quibble about his loss estimates, that's fine, but I don't see an error in the facts of the losses already reserved for.

Chris Hynes Posted On 2/25/2009 1:50:27 PM

WFC announced $99 billion in equity, with $38 billion of goodwil and intangibles, leaving $61 billion in TCE by my math. If they only have another $22 billion net of reserves under Roubini's proper calculation, or only $8 billion under Bernstein's, then you are not paying much fro the franchise, indeed possibly buying the franchise at a discount, given today's market cap of around $53 billion. If franchise banks are getting down to 1x real book, with the Fed proppong up earnings with the yield curve, it would seem like a historically opportune time to be buying them.

BobbyG Posted On 2/25/2009 2:16:10 PM

This sounds just like the cheerleading you did for FMD and COF. How did those work out?

GQTRIT Posted On 2/25/2009 2:33:07 PM

Tom I think you are great but still in denial.

Alfred M. King Posted On 2/25/2009 3:29:52 PM

I hope you sent this to Time magazine so they can print it with Roubini's answer - if he has one

BobE Posted On 2/25/2009 3:54:21 PM

A quick check of Wells Fargo's presentation from the day it agreed to buy Wachovia shows that the average mark against the entire WB portfolio was 13%. Roubini's estimate of cumulative losses in the consolidated WFC portfolio: 13%. Coincidence? Not likely.

RayBenz Posted On 2/25/2009 4:18:39 PM

Wells should sue Roubini like BankAtlantic did Dick Bove. Moreover, he has probably violated banking laws that prevent someone from questioning the solvency of a finacial institution. These academic types who want to become industry analysts need to go get their CFA and then put disclosures on everything they do. Moreover, I doubt NYU has insurance that covers their staff for libel and slander. The Stern School needs to tell Roubini to put a sock in it.

shelby@dsaco.com Posted On 2/25/2009 5:40:01 PM

he should be muzzled, best, shelby

Jamie Posted On 2/25/2009 6:31:27 PM

Ok so what about Bank of America? at this point is it Dead man walking? It trades like it.

Brian T Posted On 2/25/2009 7:19:09 PM

I don't understand where this 13 percent cumulative loss figure comes from. For example, they report having $57.7 billion unimpaired Pik-a-Pays. The 30 day delinquency is 0.10 percent, current LTV 80 percent. Are those really going to result in 13 percent loss? What's even more striking is the difference in charge off rates between WFC and WB loans, category by category. WB is better at auto loans (3.7 percent v 6.0 percent). WFC is better at construction loans because of their relationships with builders (0.55 percent charge off versus 5.9 percent). I don't see how we can extrapolate from these to 13 percent. It's interesting just by looking at the two banks how it really is possible for someone to write "good loans" or "bad loans." There isn't a one-size-fits-all loss rate (is there?). Finally, WFC says their provision is 22 billion, 320 percent of NPA "highest among large bank peers." Two question on that: what is the comparable figure for large bank peers? and is that based on the credit impaired balance or the unimpaired balance (i.e, is it more conservative if it is on the impaired balance)?

Ken Posted On 2/25/2009 11:04:02 PM

The issue I have with Roubini is he neglects the pre-provision earnings of the quality banks. For example, US Bancorp's pre-provision earnings has been around $2b a quarter for the the last couple of years including Q4 08. Does that not mean they can lose $2b a quarter and break even with the current reserves they hold? If so, isn't the real question to ask "What is the earnings power of the bank versus its current solvency?".

Chris Posted On 2/26/2009 8:44:55 AM

"And if it turns out that he’s goofed in calculating it, he ought to come out and admit it." He should. But he won't.

James Dailey Posted On 2/26/2009 8:57:58 AM

Roubini and his ilk are all trying to assume a certain amount of deterioration in collateral prices from this point forward and some comments have been excellent in stating that all lenders are not created equal. I also agree that Tom's credibility on these issues is rather strained given his inability to see this storm coming and remaining in denial throughout its duration. I have visions of Tom standing on a Florida peer during a hurricane screaming at the top of his lungs that it is sunny and calm outside. I actually think Tom and Roubini are right in different ways. Tom argues that Wells is ok essentially because they are well managed and currently is solvent/profitable. The hole in this argument is if significant collateral damage does accrue from this point - the current capital base and reserves would not be adequate. Roubini is correct in arguing this point, despite his obvious mistake relating to Wells. Ultimately, I think Tom will be more right. The Feds appear determined to stand behind the remaining big banks and incrementally provide capital so that the insanely positive cash flow the banks are enjoying from good ole fashion interest rate margins allows them to rebuild their capital positions. The plan put forth by Bernanke seems to provide time for banks to do so without necessarily suffering heavy dilution - which even at current prices for Wells and JPM some dilution is likely already priced in and then some.

gail Posted On 2/26/2009 10:32:49 AM

When one gets all this attention bringing a strong message its hard to change. I can't remember a single example. Geo Salem was so right but couldn't recognize improvement. It seems like Henry Kaufman was slow to change his mind also. I know Roubini won't make it. He likes the attention to much. But I wonder if Whitney will repeat Salem's experience. I came into banks too early last year and when I missed WM I thought I was smart. I'm humble again. But I can't get negative now. Thanks for your report last week.

H.M.Loud Posted On 2/26/2009 5:15:20 PM

the study of the doctor putting the patient at risk When NassimTaleb talks about the limits of statistics, he becomes outraged. "My outrage," he says, "is aimed at the scientist-charlatan putting society at risk using statistical methods. This is similar to iatrogenics, the study of the doctor putting the patient at risk." As a researcher inprobability, he has some credibility. In 2006, using FNMA and bank risk managers as his prime perpetrators, he wrote the following: http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/taleb08/taleb08_index.html Has this become the habit of the city?...to experiment with the city as if it were Dr. Frankenstein working on his next patient. The patient is at risk...

Brian T Posted On 2/26/2009 6:21:34 PM

One more question. In Oct 2008, the WSJ reported: "Under the old rules, Wells Fargo would have been limited to annual tax deductions stemming from the Wachovia losses of roughly $930 million over the next 20 years, or a total of $18.6 billion, estimates Mr. Willens. Wells Fargo will now be able to use all $74 billion in losses. That will likely mean additional tax savings to Wells Fargo of about $19.4 billion." When does WFC get this money back? And shouldn't this be added to their equity base?

Mark H Posted On 2/26/2009 6:40:03 PM

As a couple of other posters mentioned, I don't see a lot mention of the operating profits of these banks. JPM came out today and talked about Q1 being very profitable so far. If they can be profitable in this environment, then why are we even discussing cumulative loss estimates. So JPM might have losses of $80B, but as of now they'll have operating income to more then cover that. So it really isn't cumulative losses, but net losses that matter. Isn't it? Why are we only discussing the negatives and not the total? And considering that being the case, Roubini seems way out of line. Why would we want to nationalize a bank that has long term operating profits b/c of short term loan loss issues? We really want to destroy the economy for a temporary bump? Bove is so right about BAC so hopefully he wins out versus Roubini. Roubini would destroy the world if it was up to him... Thats what you get from academics.

alan green Posted On 2/27/2009 8:43:44 AM

it's amazing how many people you criticize. look in the mirror and think about your july 2008 bottom call.

Dr.H Posted On 2/27/2009 10:49:27 AM

Roubini is way off here, this is not a rare case either.

Damian Posted On 2/28/2009 1:30:57 PM

Tom, thanks for challenging this man. From the exchange it is apparent that intellectual rigor and integrity are not his thing. Please keep at it, investors and tax payers alike will thank you for it.
Ad for inter-arch
Ad for Bankstocks
 

     Bankstocks.com is a public web site operated by individuals who also operate investment advisory firms that serve as investment advisers to hedge funds (the "Firms"). Some articles are authored by employees of the Firms while others are authored by third parties. Under no circumstances does any article posted on Bankstocks.com represent a recommendation to buy or sell a security. This article is intended to provide insight into the financial services industry and is not a solicitation of any kind. The Firms do not vouch for the accuracy of any information contained in any article posted herein and the views expressed in any article herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Firms. The Firms buy and sell securities on behalf of their fund investors and may do so, before and after any particular article herein is published, with respect to the securities discussed in any article posted herein. The Firms’ appraisal of a company's prospects is only one factor that affects the Firms’ decision whether to buy or sell shares in that company. Other factors might include, but are not limited to, the presence of mandatory limits on individual positions, decisions regarding portfolio exposures, and general market conditions, and liquidity needs. As such, there may not always be consistency between the views expressed in this article and the Firms’ trading on behalf of their fund investors. There may be conflicts between the content posted on Bankstocks.com and the interests of the Firms. For an explanation of these conflicts, including an explanation of our trading policy, and how we resolve them, click here.

Neither the authors nor any Bankstocks.com team members can provide investment advice or respond to individual requests for recommendations. However, we encourage your feedback and welcome your comments on any of the articles on this site. Neither the authors nor Bankstocks.com has undertaken any responsibility to update any portion of this article in response to events which may transpire subsequent to its original publication date.