Fiserv
Thoughts & Comments
The "Aggregator" Bank: A Good Idea, Depending On . . . .
the price the government pays for "bad" assets, of course.

Gary Townsend
Posted 02/02/2009
Hill-Townsend Capital
gary.twnsnd@gmail.com

Congress is known for serving its legislation half-baked, so it’s surprising expectations are relatively high that it might dish up a palatable “aggregator” bank--that is, one that can be a practical mechanism for buying distressed bank assets, freeing up balance sheet capacity, and enabling lending.  The practical problems are formidable; they don’t involve how to structure a “bad bank” (that’s been done before), but rather how to price and purchase securities and loans without making current bank solvency problems worse.  

Structurally, the Resolution Trust Corporation is the model for most proposals being aired.  Recall that the RTC, which Congress created in 1989 to dispose of the real estate assets and high-yield securities of insolvent thrifts and savings institutions, was so successful that it closed shop after only five years, having disposed acquired assets of nearly $400 billion from 747 failed companies. 

But the RTC didn’t aggregate assets purchased from going concerns; rather, it was the receiver of assets from failed institutions. Which is to say, it owned the assets it planned to eventually sell. Today, as long as the Federal government intends to provide assistance instead of resolution, its “bad bank” must purchase assets at better than market if solvent banks are to have any reason to sell distressed and other assets.  How much more than market?  That’s difficult to say or to budget, even if it were politically feasible. 

Pricing issues are the centerpiece of the whole debate.  Price doesn’t always equal value, especially in current volatile, speculative markets.  Price is transactional.  Value often isn’t.  Mark-to-market accounting uses price as its basis to report a value for a company’s net assets, but in highly distressed and illiquid markets, that accounting value may be appreciably less than indicated by economic value based on expected discounted cash flows.

Take a look at an example, and you’ll see. Consider the accompanying slide from Bank of New York Mellon’s presentation last Wednesday at the 2009 Citigroup Financial Services Conference.  In the fourth quarter, the company wrote down its $5 billion portfolio of Alt-A residential MBS by $1.24 billion, or roughly 25%. That’s equivalent to the discount investors would demand if BoNY were to sell the portfolio today. In fact, the company intends to hold the portfolio to maturity.  Using identical assumptions, its “expected loss” due to cash flow impairment is only $208 million, or just 4% of the portfolio’s face value. Difference between the mark-to-market loss and the internal, expected loss: $1 billion.



Bank of New York’s disclosure suggests the company believes that mark-to-market accounting has overstated its losses, and that it will recoup the losses as markets normalize.  For the markets generally, mark-to-market accounting has caused financial services companies to book losses of as much a $2 trillion by some estimates, while the expected loss is probably only a fraction of that amount.  Which is more realistic--or relevant to government policy?

Though these may be “toxic” assets, as popularly described by the media, portfolio managers are, quite reasonably, loath to sell performing assets at a market price of 75 if they can reasonably expect to realize a value of 95 if held to maturity. 

To accumulate assets for its “bad bank”, the government could possibly direct the sale of certain bank assets (private-label mortgage-backed securities below some credit rating, say).  That’s been tried before, when the Office of Thrift Supervision required the sale of all high yield “junk” bonds during the thrift crisis.  Naturally, prices cratered, which help eviscerate the capital of many solvent institutions, and greatly increased the final cost to taxpayers.

But it created a lot of business at the RTC--and substantial profit to investors that bought RTC assets at deep discounts. 

Perhaps the large disconnect between low market prices for risk assets and the much higher value of unimpaired discounted cash flows reflects speculation that the government will repeat past errors?

What do you think? Let me know!


  Add your comment

 

 

Erich Riesenberg Posted On 2/2/2009 1:31:31 PM

Was the claim about mark to market accounting first made in mid-2007? How far have prices come down since then? Free market champions seem less championish when it comes to using the free market to price their own assets.

KC Kid Posted On 2/2/2009 2:08:25 PM

It seems like the government's ability to hold to maturity or any time period considerably longer than banks can is the key to reasonable valuation. In that case the valuation would move toward a continuing cash flow model and away from a “mark to thin and jittery market” model. When I buy bonds for income, fully intending to hold them to maturity, I don't much care what the market thinks they are worth in the interim period. I just care about cash flow and would usually be using a laddering strategy. The same is even truer with my speculative real estate investments. Besides, are all these "mark to market" advocates that refer to "mark to model" numbers as "mark to fantasy" unaware of the 2000 bubble in market prices or how about tulips? It can be fantasy in both directions. Sometimes "mark to model" is more accurate if the underlying assumptions are reasonably close.

Bull City Mike Posted On 2/2/2009 2:25:57 PM

Banks can't have it both ways. Either sell at a deep discount to get bad loans off the books or hold them until maturity and keep the risk (including the opportunity cost of tying up capital). Seems like they want the best of all worlds - getting the present value based on holding them until maturity with a discount rate equal to that lesser risk. Either bite the bullet or bite your lip.

David Perry Posted On 2/2/2009 3:35:24 PM

I'm not a banker so may I please ask someone to explain something to me? Why don't the politicians and bureaucrats let the major banks keep their assets, toxic and otherwise, and instead provide capital to healthy banks that can use it to make loans? I know of many projects that are stalled for lack of financing. Thank you.

Albert Upsher Posted On 2/2/2009 5:07:02 PM

The government's discount rate is significantly lower than that of the institutions presently holding these assets. Why not allow these institutions to sell assets to the "bad bank" at a value based on present cash flow discounted by the government's cost of capital. if these assets became further impaired, the selling institution would have to add additional assets(cash flow) to allow the government to meet its expected IRR. You could also require participating seller to contribute capital to the "bad bank" to offset these losses. This would force the seller to be realistic, but permit him to enhance his liquidity throught the difference in the the two rates of return.

KC Kid Posted On 2/2/2009 6:20:04 PM

It seems like the government's ability to hold to maturity or any time period considerably longer than banks can is the key to reasonable valuation. In that case the valuation would move toward a continuing cash flow model and away from a “mark to thin and jittery market” model. When I buy bonds for income, fully intending to hold them to maturity, I don't much care what the market thinks they are worth in the interim period. I just care about cash flow and would usually be using a laddering strategy. The same is even truer with my speculative real estate investments. Besides, are all these "mark to market" advocates that refer to "mark to model" numbers as "mark to fantasy" unaware of the 2000 bubble in market prices or how about tulips? It can be fantasy in both directions. Sometimes "mark to model" is more accurate if the underlying assumptions are reasonably close.

RGregory Posted On 2/2/2009 7:56:30 PM

Why not use a reverse backstop approach? Gov't buys at MTM value plus 10% - 20%. Bank backstops actual Gov't losses in excess of initial Govt assumptions 7 years later. Annual public status reporting by Govt to begin after 3.5 years. This should settle the market for now and move us through the crisis. There may be problems for some banks in 3.5 years due to excessive Govt loss experience but that's a whole new dimension in time.

housam Posted On 2/2/2009 9:17:47 PM

I am reluctant to agree with your distinction between value vs. price.I think that one of the cornerstones of capitalism is that something is only worth what someone is willing to pay for it now,not tomorrow and not till maturity.To anybody who has invested, the natural and logical conclusion one could arrive at when it comes to evaluating assets is price=value*risk.To make your argument feasible you have to put risk at 1 which is as far away from reality as you could possibly be.The truth of the matter is that values of assets in depressed markets have a tendency to feed on themselves which maximizes risk and distances potential buyers(the value of certain assets(mortgage backed securities) will plummet in a self perpetuating cycle as other assets value decline).The danger is in making flaud assumptions regarding assets which could lead to under representation of the possible risks to taxpayers and quite possibly their children as the true value emerges in the not so distant future.I get frustrated when I look back at the inverted yield curve in 2006 and how so many analyst and so-called experts came out and tried to justify it with all sorts of claims except the only logical one and we are currently paying the price of not heeding to that warning.Maybe this whole bad bank and continued taxpayer ripoff will prove to be no different.

Robert Millman Posted On 2/3/2009 10:26:22 AM

Could a Distressed Assets Bank (troubled and toxic are way too emotional) be set up which simply aggregates these "junk" assets and then auctions them off in tranches--15% every 6 months? All at once will make the prices too low. What happens to the solvency and asset quality of the banks post this transfer to the DAB? Thanks

jaimesal Posted On 3/10/2009 4:40:16 PM

I am not an expert in securities regulation, but I have been a regulator in other fields, and I know what regulation means. I can not overstate the risk involved in markets overstated regulation. What I have been reading here tells me that a real effort should be made by US authorities to optimize the extent and depth of securities regulation and make sure that no damage is being made to not only USA investors but from all over the world.
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