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From Barron's, A Mortgage Relief Plan That Actually Sounds Workable
It would ease delinquencies--and give the economy a boost, too

Thomas Brown  ( about me )
Posted 12/08/2008
bankstocks.com
tbrown@bankstocks.com

Three cheers for Jonathan Laing for his proposal in Barron’s this weekend for how to solve the mortgage crisis. Laing’s entire article is definitely worth reading. In a nutshell, though, his plan boils down to four basic actions. Laing says the federal government should:

1.    Offer to refinance every U.S. homeowner’s mortgage at a 4.5% fixed rate.

2.   Make similar mortgages available to home buyers (just as the Treasury is said to have considered this week).

3.  Use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to repackage all new loans as safe securities for investors.

4.  Modify the $500 billion of subprime and Alt-A loans in arrears.  Extend their maturities to 40 years; in certain cases, pay down principal, as well.

Laing’s plan would provide three huge benefits. First, it would help delinquent borrowers who want to stay in their homes by substantially reducing their monthly payments. Second, risk of moral hazard would be reduced since all borrowers, not just delinquent ones, would be eligible for rate relief. Lastly, the entire economy would get a needed jolt, as borrowers’ reduced monthly payments would cause disposable income to soar.

And here’s a fourth, bonus benefit: lower fixed mortgage rates would go a long way toward stemming the decline in home prices.  

I like Laing’s proposal a lot, but would make one important change, and offer an addition, too. First, I wouldn’t set the 4.5% mortgage rate by fiat, but instead would have the Treasury issue debt for Fannie and Freddie or would explicitly guarantee their debt. That would cause the agencies’ borrowing costs to plummet, which in turn would likely lead to 4.5% mortgage rates. Thus mortgage rates would still be tied to some market. 

And I’d make one addition: I’d have Fannie and Freddie temporarily ease their underwriting standards regarding maximum loan-to-value, and let any borrower who’s stayed current on his mortgage for the past twelve months refinance at the new lower rate. However, I would suggest that the size of any new mortgage can’t be larger than the mortgage being refinanced.

I also believe Fannie and Freddie should also be willing to purchase subprime mortgage loans created in such a refinancing, priced at a rate set at some meaningful premium (say 250 basis points) over the conforming conventional loan rate.

Jon Laing’s proposal, along with my suggestions, would do a lot of good things to help end the mortgage crisis. The plan would help struggling homeowners stay in their homes, and would ease the downward pressure on home prices. It would reduce the moral hazard that arises from helping only delinquent borrowers. And it would help consumer spending by boosting borrowers’ confidence and putting more discretionary cash in their pockets. 

I don’t see a lot of downside. So let’s get going, first by lowering Fannie’s and Freddie’s funding costs, and then putting that funding advantage to work!

What do you think? Let me know!


  Add your comment

 

 

JimmyJohnson Posted On 12/8/2008 4:17:16 PM

BRAVO! Jimmy likes the plan.

Tom Posted On 12/8/2008 7:03:08 PM

As someone with a 4 7/8% ARM scheduled to reset next year, who has never missed a payment on anything, and who is unwilling to trash his credit score to get "bailed out" I wholeheartedly agree. Actually I have seen the substance of this proposal floating around elsewhere for a few months; I believe Cramer or one of his folks at RealMoney suggested it. Certainly it would be much more efficient (and overall less costly to the taxpayer) for current creditworthy borrowers to be offered a simple streamlined refi that would eliminate or reduce their future interest rate risk, and hence reduce future credit risk to the noteholders. I agree that some risk-based pricing premium (250bp) as you suggested is appropriate, and wouldn't be so punitive that your girlfriend Elizabeth Warren would gripe about it.

roanokela Posted On 12/8/2008 10:19:27 PM

all these mortgages would have to be re recorded and the fees to localities would be substantial. The real losers would be investors in preforming mortgage pools that would see their higher yields disappear.

tjwm500 Posted On 12/9/2008 8:48:51 AM

roanokela brings up a good point. I am wondering if any large MBS investor would be willing to comment on their opinion of this plan. We have already seen one lawsuit arise from an investor worried about restructuring their collateral. Is the threat of lawsuits (as well as the enormous amount of legal restructuring of contracts)enough to derail this plan? Are there any investors who would vote in favor of this plan in order to get this mess behind us?

Nils Posted On 12/9/2008 10:35:22 AM

tjwm, Since the currently outstanding mortgage contracts get repaid according to contract, I don't see how a current investor can legally prevent this (other than, as you mentioned, in case of restructuring of existing contracts). Yes, he may lose money but that looks to me like normal market losses. Note that given current spreads on RMBS he may even gain money.

cjcdpfl Posted On 12/9/2008 3:12:37 PM

Makes sense to me. I suspect Bill Gross would be one investor not happy with this proposal. His overweight mortgage bet would lock in a lot of underperformance for the Total Return hedge fund.

observer Posted On 12/10/2008 1:08:38 PM

Interesting that Ed Hyman, one of the most astute economic observers, featured Laing's proposal in this weeks International Strategy & Investment Weekly Economic Report.. Hopefully the folks in Washington read.

mary Posted On 5/13/2010 12:24:38 PM

The crux of the matter is making mortgages affordable sub-prime or no sub-prime. If interest rates were reduced across the board to 4.5% or even 5% which is considered a commercially viable rate , even an "F" grade student would see the difference in debt repayment across the board and the economy as a whole as there would be more disposable income to spend.
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